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KEY POINTS
	 The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) for Poorest Countries provides for a  
time-bound suspension of debt repayments to public creditors.
	 Commercial creditors are not so bound.
	 Earlier this year there was an initiative to introduce a moratorium on debt service 
on English law governed contracts, which was considered as part of the Corporate 
Governance and Insolvency Bill.
Authors Dr Stephen Connelly, Dr Celine Tan, Karina Patricio Ferreira Lima and Chris Tassis
The G20 Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative: what of commercial creditors?
Draft legislation, for potential inclusion in the Corporate Insolvency and Governance 
Bill 2020 (CIGB), to introduce a moratorium on debt service on English law governed 
sovereign bond contracts entered into by highly indebted states, to free up resources 
for those countries to support health, humanitarian and social and economic 
measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, was blocked at the last minute. Whilst the 
proposal did not fit with the UK-focused aims of CIGB 2020 the issues remain and are 
discussed in this article.
INTRODUCTION
nIn response to the global economic shock triggered by the COVID-19 
pandemic, the G20 and Paris Club 
announced the Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative (DSSI) for Poorest Countries on 
15 April 2020. The DSSI commits member 
states official creditors that are members 
of the G20 and Paris Club to a time-bound 
suspension of debt service to eligible countries 
that request such forbearance.1 Yet even 
though the G20 “called upon” commercial 
creditors to support the DSSI and develop 
similar terms of reference for voluntary 
private sector participation in the initiative, 
the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 
expressed several reservations in this regard.2
At the request of NGOs and members 
of the City of London legal community, the 
authors prepared a timely legislative proposal 
designed to support the DSSI. Draft 
legislation was presented to the Treasury 
for potential inclusion in what was the 
Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 
2020. While ultimately it was determined 
that the proposal did not “fit” with the UK-
focused aims of that Bill, the issues which 
drove the proposal – not least the absence 
of commercial creditor engagement with 
the DSSI – remain. This article serves as 
intelligence for those interested in various 
initiatives designed to reform sovereign debt 
restructuring, and as an example of the kind 
of surgical legislative intervention possible at 
this time.
THE PROPOSAL
The aim of the proposal was to give legislative 
effect to the DSSI to private creditors by 
granting a statutory standstill to all eligible 
countries on qualifying bonds owed by 
the country that are governed by English 
law. These correspond to 90% of the bond 
contracts owed by countries covered by the 
DSSI.3
The proposed legislation was based on 
the wording for the Debt Relief (Developing 
Countries) Act 2010, which prevented 
creditors of beneficiary countries of the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative from recovering amounts in excess 
of that consistent with the HIPC Initiative. 
In essence, it identifies qualifying debt and 
grants debtor states the option to seek  
a moratorium on execution and enforcement 
of that debt in the UK, in a manner similar to 
the insolvency moratorium one finds in  
Sch B1, Insolvency Act 1986. In other words, 
it amounts to a statement by the UK that 
while it respects contractual obligations, 
it regards it as unseemly that the courts of 
England and Wales be used to support debt 
enforcement which undermines international 
initiatives to which it is a party.
This proposal is underpinned by a similar 
rationale to the 2010 Act, ie that continuing 
debt service to commercial creditors at this 
time diverts official debt relief – provided 
through the DSSI or other channels such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s 
Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust 
(CCRT)4 – intended to free up resources  
for countries to support health, humanitarian 
and social and economic measures during  
the COVID-19 pandemic. It remains on  
the table.
The temporary standstill would be 
voluntary, as debtor countries would have an 
option, not an obligation, to rely on it.  
Thus, whenever a creditor brings legal 
proceedings before an English court in 
respect of a qualifying debt, the debtor 
country may apply to the court in which the 
proceedings have been brought to stay the 
proceedings during the relevant period.  
It is worth noting that the standstill would 
in no way release the debt of the country, nor 
amount to a waiver or forbearance on the part 
of the creditor.
The proposed legislation does not 
directly intervene in a contract to suspend 
debt payments, and as such it is still open 
to creditors to declare a default under the 
relevant contract. Instead, the legislation 
mirrors existing insolvency legislation in 
suspending the link between contractual 
default and the execution and enforcement  
of contractual rights.
RATIONALE
As the Jubilee Campaign has shown,  
there are question marks over the efficacy of  
a voluntary agreement covering a disparate 
class of creditors and protection against 
future litigation for missed repayments under 
a voluntary arrangement.5
Previous experience with the HIPC 
Initiative and other Paris Club restructurings 
has demonstrated that without enshrining 
debt standstills and/or cancellation into law, 
private creditors are unlikely to participate 
fully and give effect to multilaterally 
organised debt relief initiatives.
Reliance on a purely voluntary 
arrangement may also generate collective 























Stephen Connelly  is an associate professor of law at the University of Warwick and  
Co-Director of the Centre for the Law, Regulation and Governance of the Global Economy 
(GLOBE). Email: s.j.connelly@warwick.ac.uk
Celine Tan is a reader in law at the University of Warwick and Co-Director of the Centre 
for the Law, Regulation and Governance of the Global Economy (GLOBE).  
Email: celine.tan@warwick.ac.uk
action problems in which a group of private 
creditors would seek to benefit from the 
increased repayment capacity of eligible 
countries, generated by the official debt 
standstill, in order to keep obtaining debt 
repayment in full during this challenging 
time. The current situation poses the classic 
free-rider problem, in which some creditors 
may not engage in the initiative in the hope 
that they can free ride on the concessions 
offered by other creditors. This would  
create a strong incentive for otherwise 
cooperative creditors to refuse participation 
in the DSSI, thus undermining the 
arrangement as a whole.
Since most of potentially eligible private 
debt is governed by English law, this 
situation has significant legal and political 
implications for the UK. We argue that if 
the DSSI is not accompanied by a statutory 
standstill for private debt, English courts 
(more than any other jurisdiction) could end 
up enforcing the debts of private creditors 
free-riding on the DSSI, CCRT and other 
debt relief measures funded by the UK 
taxpayers. This could give rise to the same 
situation which provided the impetus for the 
2020 Act, ie the purchase of distressed debt 
on the secondary markets by speculative 
investors with the aim of recovering the 
face value at a later date.6 The 2010 Act was 
enacted to prevent this free-rider problem 
and together with similar legislation in other 
jurisdictions, such as Belgium7 and France,8 
has successfully prevented predatory 
behaviour that is jeopardising multilateral 
collective action on sovereign debt. 
Reliance on contract law provisions 
to give effect to the DSSI and other debt 
relief measures is also inadequate. For 
example, reliance on “force majeure” clauses 
or the doctrine of frustration to set aside 
contractual debt service obligations leaves 
too much uncertainty as to what constitutes 
a reasonable circumstance under which to 
vary or set aside the contract and does not 
necessarily deal with events. The difficulty 
with leaving negotiation of force majeure to 
private parties is that this places an onus on 
those parties to identify exactly that which 
they did not expect to occur, and to rationally 
weigh and assume the risks of what can be 
macroeconomic events. Outside of specialist 
insurance markets this places an undue 
planning burden on private parties, and in no 
way advances the possibility of a co-ordinated 
response to the pandemic. Unsurprisingly 
then, the average finance contract does not 
contain an explicit force majeure clause at all. 
The contractual burden of events such as the 
pandemic fall almost entirely on the side  
of borrowers.
The only way to deal with these gaps 
in the law as it stands is through legislative 
intervention. A temporary standstill in the 
enforcement of debt contracts in this case 
serves the role of completing those contracts. 
The temporary standstill legislation would 
establish the unenforceability of performance 
in ways that the reasonable contracting 
parties would have wanted had they been able 
to predict this contingency.
A statutory standstill to give effect to 
the DSSI sends a message that the UK 
government is committed to ensuring that 
low-income countries, especially highly 
indebted states, have at their disposal the 
full amount of financial resources available 
to them. It will also ensure that the other 
significant financial packages announced by 
the UK government to support developing 
countries in these times of crisis, including 
through the Department for International 
Development (DFID),9 in the form of 
bilateral overseas development aid (ODA) 
and contributions to other multilateral 
financial initiatives, are not diluted and/or 
diverted to debt service.
IMPLICATIONS
There are some concerns that a statutory 
standstill may constitute undue intervention in 
private debt contracts governed by English law 
and that this will have negative ramifications 
on the UK legal and financial services.
However, as the discussion above 
demonstrates, legislation would bring 
some certainty to the enforcement of debt 
contracts. Far from undermining credit 
markets, it would support these markets. 
Research shows that public interventions to 
suspend debt payments do not automatically 
undermine credit markets or undermine 
freedom of contracting.10 In fact, they 
have had the opposite effect in some cases 
by resurrecting debt markets following 
the adoption of such measures.11 The 
reason why debt markets recovered was 
that creditors had anticipated widespread 
default in the absence of any modification 
of the repayment terms. By temporarily 
suspending the debt payments, the risk of an 
outright default was reduced.
In suspending the right to enforce legal 
claims, the proposed legislation foresees 
a continued role for the parties to bargain 
in the shadow of the law.12 The proposed 
standstill amounts to a variation of the 
balance of negotiating power between the 
parties, removing the “nuclear option” 
of legal proceedings from the table for a 
short period. We do not, however, expect 
parties to do nothing; in the changed 
circumstances parties should, and very 
likely will, negotiate a route through this 
crisis. By certifying through legislation that 
the COVID-19 crisis is a highly unusual 
and extraordinary event which the parties 
could not have reasonably described in the 
contract, the UK Parliament would ensure 
that no floodgates will be opened in English 
law to modify contract terms unless 
absolutely necessary.  n
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